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ARGUMENT 
I. THE FINDINGS IN THE PARIA PROCEEDING RELATING TO THE 
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AND THE ALTER EGO ISSUES ARE NOT 
BINDING UPON PGM BECAUSE PGM WAS NOT NAMED, WAS NOT 
SERVED, AND DID NOT APPEAR IN THE PARIA PROCEEDING. 
A. The Finding of Fraudulent Transfer in the Paria Proceeding Is Not 
Binding on PGM as a Transferee because PGM Was Not a Party to the 
Paria Proceeding and because the Remedies Available to a Creditor for 
Relief against a Fraudulent Transfer Are Subject to the Procedures 
Prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Westchester argues that the trial court's dismissal of PGM's Complaint was proper 
based upon the finding in the Paria proceeding that Paria transferred its property to PGM 
with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud Mr. Zimmerman's and Paria Group's 
creditors." Record at 0017. After this finding, the Paria court imposed a constructive 
trust upon PGM's assets "to the extent necessary to satisfy Westchester's judgment" in 
the amount of $244,976.82. Record at 0016-0015. Westchester contends that the 
judgment entered against PGM in the Paria proceeding may be affirmed because Utah 
Code Annotated § 25-6-8 provides that a creditor may obtain an avoidance of a fraudulent 
transfer to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim. 
This argument does not provide an independent basis for dismissal as urged by 
Westchester. Westchester ignores the fact that PGM was not named, was not served, and 
did not otherwise appear in the Paria proceeding. As the United States Supreme Court 
explained, "It is elementary that one is not bound by a judgment in personam from 
1 
litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a 
party by service of process." Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research. Inc.. 395 U.S. 
100, 110, 89 S. Ct. 1562, 1569 (1969). As the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Service of summons in conformance with the mode prescribed by statute is 
deemed jurisdictional, for it is service of process, not actual knowledge of the • 
commencement of the action, which confers jurisdiction.... The proper issuance 
and service of summons is the means of invoking the jurisdiction of the court and 
of acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant; these cannot be supplanted by mere 
notice, by letter, telephone or any other such means.
 ( 
Murdock v. Blake. 484 P.2d 164, 167 (Utah 1971): see also Garcia v. Garcia. 712 P.2d 
288 (Utah 1986) (holding that the requirements of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 4 relating 
i 
to service of process are jurisdictional). Because PGM was not named, nor served, in the 
Paria proceeding, PGM is not bound by the findings and judgment entered in the Paria 
proceeding. 
1. The remedies available to a creditor for relief against a 
fraudulent transfer are subject to Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-9 
and the procedures prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil ( 
Procedure. 
Westchester fails to recognize that the remedies available to a creditor under Utah 
Code Annotated § 25-6-8 are subject to the limitations of Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-9 < 
and the procedures prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 25-6-8, 
Remedies of creditors, provides: 
(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this chapter, a 
creditor, subject to the limitations in Section 25-6-9, may obtain: 
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy 
< 
2 
the creditor's claim; 
(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset 
transferred or other property of the transferee in accordance with the 
procedure prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(c) subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance with 
applicable rules of civil procedure: 
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a 
transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property; 
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred 
or of other property of the transferee; or 
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require. 
Because PGM was not a party to the Paria proceeding, the 
finding of fraudulent transfer and the imposition of a 
constructive trust should be vacated. 
Because PGM was not named and was not served in the Paria proceeding pursuant 
to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the judgment and findings entered in the Paria 
proceeding are not binding upon PGM. Moreover, the finding that the transfer was 
fraudulent and the order voiding the transfer of assets from Paria to PGM and imposing a 
constructive trust on PGM's assets should be vacated and set aside because PGM, as 
transferee of the assets, was an indispensable party. Though Utah has not addressed this 
issue specifically, numerous Utah cases which allow a creditor to reach the assets 
fraudulently transferred include the transferee as a named and served defendant. Butler v. 
Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987); Territorial Savings & Loan Association v. Baird. 
781 P.2d 454 (Utah App. 1989); National Loan Investors. L.P. v. Givens. 952 P.2d 1067 
(Utah 1998). 
(Bold added.) 
2. 
3 
Requiring that the transferee of a fraudulent conveyance be a named party of an 
action to set aside the conveyance and execute on the transferred asset is consistent with 
decisions from other jurisdictions. In Tanaka v. Nagata. 868 P.2d 450,454 (Hawaii 
1994), the Supreme Court of Hawaii vacated and set aside the trial court's order granting 
the creditor's motion to execute on a fraudulently transferred asset on the grounds that the 
transferees should have been named as party defendants in underlying action. The court 
held: 
where a creditor alleges a fraudulent transfer of property from a judgment debtor 
to a transferee who retains title to the subject property or who claims an interest in 
the property or its proceeds, the transferee is a necessary party to any action 
seeking to set aside the transfer, [footnote omitted] Such an action for relief 
against a transfer alleged to be fraudulent should be brought pursuant to Hawai'i 
Revised Statutes (HRS) ch. 651C (1985) [citation omitted], and should expressly 
name the alleged fraudulent transferees as defendants.1 
Tanaka. 868 P.2d at 454 (bold added). The court further explained: 
Fundamental principles of due process require that transferees who claim an 
interest in real property or its proceeds have a full and fair opportunity to contest 
claims of fraudulent transfer. 
Id. at 455. In reaching this holding, the Hawaii Supreme Court relied on the decisions of 
the following jurisdictions: Simmons v. Clark Equipment Credit Corp.. 554 So.2d 398, 
399 (Ala. 1989) (grantee who retained title to property was necessary party to action by 
grantor's creditors to set aside conveyance as fraudulent); T W M Homes. Inc. v. 
Atherwood Realty & Investment Co.. 214 Cal.App.2d 826, 848, 29 Cal.Rptr. 887, 899 
"HRS ch. 651C (1985) is substantially similar to Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-8. 
4 
(1963) (transferees were necessary party defendants in action to set aside fraudulent 
conveyance); Guice v. Modica. 337 So.2d 302, 303 (La. App. 1976) (children to whom 
debtor made donation of property were indispensable parties to suit by creditor to nullify 
donation); Mihajlovski v. Elfakir. 355 N.W.2d 264, 267 (Mich. App. 1984) (presence of 
grantee who retains title to property was essential to permit court to render complete relief 
in action to set aside fraudulent conveyance); Murray v. Murray. 358 So.2d 723, 725 
(Miss. 1978) (grantee is necessary party in action to set aside fraudulent conveyance); 
Dempsev & Spring. P.C. v. Ramsav. 435 N.Y.S.2d 336, 337 (1981) (trial court acted 
improperly in determining that defendant's conveyance of property to his daughter was 
fraudulent where no notice or opportunity to appear was afforded to daughter, who was 
present owner of record); Fraley Ins. Agency v. Johnston. 784 P.2d 430, 431 (Okla. App. 
1989) (in action to set aside fraudulent conveyance or transfer of property, grantee or 
transferee claiming interest in subject property was necessary and indispensable to 
resolution of claim); Becker v. Becker. 416 A.2d 156, 162 (Vt. 1980) (transfer of property 
creates an interest in grantee that made grantee necessary party to action for fraudulent 
conveyance, even though no fraud on grantee's part needed to be shown); see also. 
Kennedy, Reception of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. 43 S.C.L.Rev. 655, 673 
(1992) (to avoid constitutional due process objections, any transferee or other claimant to 
property transferred or its proceeds should be party to any creditor's action that would 
affect claimant's rights in property). 
5 
Further, a fraudulent transfer is not voidable against a person who took in good 
faith and for reasonably equivalent value. Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-9(a). There are 
no findings in the record of the Paria proceeding provided to the PGM proceeding which 
establish that PGM was not a good faith purchaser for value. This is a result of the fact 
that PGM never made an appearance in the Paria proceeding. To enforce the judgment 
entered in the Paria proceeding against PGM when PGM was never afforded an 
opportunity to be heard by appearing and defending would violate PGM's right to due 
process. 
Because PGM, as transferee, was not made a party to the Paria proceeding, the ' 
finding and constructive trust entered therein are void and should be vacated. 
Consequently, the judgment in the Paria proceeding "is not res adjudicata of anything." 
In re Evans. 130 P. 217, 225 (Utah 1913); Matsushima v. Rego. 696 P.2d 843, 845 
(Hawai'i 1985) (the doctrine of res judicata is predicated upon a valid judgment and a 
I 
void judgment may not be used to invoke its application); Estate of Blaney. 607 P.2d 354, 
357 (Wyo. 1980) (a void judgment is not res judicata). 
B. The Judgment and the Findings in the Paria Proceeding Are Not < 
Binding on PGM because PGM Was Not Subject to the Jurisdiction of 
the Paria Court. 
Westchester's arguments for enforcing both the fraudulent transfer findings and 
the judgment against PGM are based on the allegation that PGM is the alter ego of Paria 
and Stephen Zimmerman. Essentially Westchester's argument presupposes the answer to 
i 
6 
the issue which PGM seeks to litigate: Whether PGM is the alter ego of Stephen 
Zimmerman and/or Paria. 
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that a stipulation that one 
corporation is the alter ego of another corporation is not "an adequate substitute for the 
normal methods of obtaining jurisdiction over a person or a corporation." Zenith Radio 
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.. 395 U.S. 1005 110, 89 S. Ct. 1562, 1569 (1969). 
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court also indicated that a determination that one 
corporation is the alter ego of another corporation would not be binding on the 
corporation which was not subject to the jurisdiction of the court so finding, even if the 
issue of alter ego had been actually litigated. As the Court explained: 
Perhaps Zenith could have proved and the trial court might have found that HRI 
and Hazeltine were alter egos; but absent jurisdiction over Hazeltine, that 
determination would bind only HRI. If the alter ego issue had been litigated, 
and if the trial court had decided that HRI and Hazeltine were one and the same 
entity and that jurisdiction over HRI gave the court jurisdiction over Hazeltine, 
perhaps Hazeltine's appearance before judgment with full opportunity to 
contest jurisdiction would warrant entry of judgment against it.[2] But that is 
not what occurred here. The trial court's judgment was based wholly on HRTs 
stipulation. HRI may have executed the stipulation to avoid litigating the alter ego 
issue, [footnote omitted] but this fact cannot foreclose Hazeltine, which has never 
had its day in court on the question of whether it and its subsidiary should be 
considered the same entity for purposes of this litigation. 
Zenith. 395 U.S. at 111, 89 S. Ct. at 1570 (bold added). 
In the present case it is undisputed that PGM was not named, was not served, and 
2Hazeltine, unlike PGM, filed a "special appearance" after Zenith proposed that 
judgment be entered against it. Zenith, 395 U.S. at 109, 89 S. Ct. at 1569. 
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did not appear in the Paria proceeding. It is also undisputed that PGM never made a 
special appearance "with full opportunity to contest jurisdiction." As a result, there was 
no jurisdiction over PGM in the Paria proceeding, and the judgment and findings entered 
therein relating to the alter ego issue and the fraudulent transfer are not binding on PGM. 
Essentially, because PGM was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Paria court, the 
findings and judgment therein as to PGM are void. Thus, the findings and judgment in 
the Paria proceeding are not res judicata. In re Evans. 130 P. at 225. 
1. Even if the alter ego issue were fully litigated in the Paria 
proceeding, a determination that PGM is the alter ego of Paria 
and/or Stephen Zimmerman is not binding on PGM who never 
appeared to contest jurisdiction. 
Westchester attempts to distinguish the holding in Zenith by arguing that the issue 
of alter ego was fully litigated in the Paria proceeding. Even if such issue had been 
actually litigated, it is doubtful that it was fully and fairly litigated because PGM never 
appeared in the Paria proceeding. Westchester contends that the court in the Paria 
proceeding based its finding that Stephen Zimmerman was the alter ego of Paria and 
PGM on numerous "other circumstances" which justified the court's judgment against 
PGM. Appellee's Brief, p. 29. Westchester argues that "PGM/Paria/Zimmerman had an 
opportunity to folly and completely litigate the issue of whether PGM, Paria, and 
Zimmerman were alter egos." Id. 
This argument ignores the fact that PGM was never subject to the Paria court's 
8 
jurisdiction because PGM was not named, was not served, and did not appear in the Paria 
proceeding. Basically, Westchester's argument is that PGM had the opportunity to 
litigate the issue because it is the alter ego of Steven Zimmerman and Paria. Such 
reasoning is circular and contrary to the sound reasoning of the United States Supreme 
Court. Despite Westchester's attempts to distinguish it, the holding in Zenith is precisely 
on point. The United States Supreme Court held that the stipulation and Hazeltine's 
special appearance to contest jurisdiction "with full opportunity to contest jurisdiction" 
were not adequate substitutes for the "normal methods of obtaining jurisdiction over a 
person or corporation." Zenith. 395 U.S. at 109-110, 89 S. Ct. 1562, 1569. Thus, even 
though the alter ego issue may arguably have been fully litigated in the Paria proceeding, 
PGM never had a full opportunity to contest jurisdiction in the Paria case. This is 
because PGM was not named, was not served, and never entered an appearance-the 
normal methods of obtaining jurisdiction over a corporation—in the Paria proceeding. 
Therefore, it is clear that the findings and judgment entered against PGM in the Paria 
proceeding are void and not binding on PGM. Consequently, those findings and 
judgment are not res judicata to PGM. In re Evans. 130 P. at 225. 
2. There is no privity between PGM and Stephen Zimmerman and 
Paria such that res judicata would apply. 
Westchester argues that PGM is bound by the findings and judgment in the Paria 
proceeding because Stephen Zimmerman represented both Paria and PGM in the Paria 
9 
proceeding, despite the fact that there is no finding and no evidence that Stephen 
Zimmerman appeared in the Paria proceeding on behalf of PGM. Westchester bases its 
argument on the fact that Stephen Zimmerman is a director of both corporations.3 
Westchester states "Stephen Zimmerman is the president and CEO of Paria Group and of 
i 
PGM." Appellee's Brief, page 16. This statement is patently false. As the addendum to 
Westchester's brief clearly indicates, the president of PGM is Jenifer Gordon-not 
Stephen Zimmerman. Appellee's Brief, page A-2. 
Westchester sets forth the general rule that a corporation controlled by the same 
person who controlled the corporation involved in the first litigation is bound by the < 
judgment. Appellee's Brief, page 19. Though PGM does not dispute the accuracy of this 
general rule, it does dispute the rule's relevancy to this action. The cases cited by 
Westchester to support the above-mentioned rule are factually distinguishable. In several 
of the cases, the plaintiff, after bringing an action personally, attempted to bring the same 
action as shareholder of a closely-held corporation. The courts found that the closely-
held corporation and the owners should not be regarded as distinct. Thus, a judgment 
against the shareholder personally would be conclusive on the corporation, and vice- ( 
versa. 
The cases cited by Westchester, wherein privity was found to exist between the 
3
 Westchester also bases its argument on Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 59, 
comment e. However, this Restatement section has not been adopted in Utah. < 
10 
officers or shareholders and the corporation, are distinguishable from the present case 
because Stephen Zimmerman is not a shareholder, officer, or owner of PGM. Carla 
Zimmerman is the sole shareholder of PGM. Westchester assumes that because the Paria 
court found Paria and Stephen Zimmerman to be alter egos, somehow Stephen 
Zimmerman's appearance in the Paria proceeding on behalf of Paria is binding on PGM. 
Though Paria and Stephen Zimmerman may be considered one and the same for litigation 
purposes because Stephen Zimmerman is a shareholder of Paria, this privity does not 
automatically extend to PGM simply because Zimmerman is also a director of PGM. 
This is because Westchester's argument ignores the general rule that: 
The corporate entity is distinct although all or a majority of its stock is owned by a 
single individual or corporation, or although the corporation is a so-called "family" 
or "close" corporation... 
18 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 45. Stephen Zimmerman appeared in the Paria proceeding 
individually and on behalf of Paria. Because Stephen Zimmerman is not an officer or 
shareholder of PGM and because there are no evidence and no findings that Stephen 
Zimmerman was appearing on behalf of PGM in the Paria proceeding, it cannot be said 
that PGM is bound by Stephen's appearance in the Paria proceeding. PGM was not a 
named party in the first litigation, and therefore PGM should not be precluded from 
having its day in court. 
Westchester also contends that PGM is in privity with Paria because PGM is 
Paria's successor in interest. Appellee's Brief, page 21. While PGM did purchase assets 
11 
from Paria, these assets were not the subject matter of the litigation and PGM did not 
obtain the same interests as Paria in these assets. A "successor in interest" is defined as: 
One who follows another in ownership or control of property. In order to be a 
"successor in interest", a party must continue to retain the same rights as original 
owner without change in ownership and there must be change in form only and not 
in substance, and transferee is not a "successor in interest." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, abridged 6th edition, (1991), page 998 (bold added). 
Because PGM is the transferee of Paria's assets and because Paria did not transfer any of 
its liabilities to PGM, PGM is not Paria's successor in interest. 
In arguing the PGM is Paria's successor in interest, Westchester relies on the 
following rule on successor liability: 
The rule for a claim based on successor liability is that where one company 
sells or otherwise transfers all its assets to another company the latter is not liable 
for the debts and liabilities of the transferor, except where: . . . (3) the purchasing 
corporation is merely a continuation of the selling corporation; or (4) the 
transaction is entered into fraudulently in order to escape liability for such debts. 
Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways. Inc.. 374 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah App. July 21, 
1999). Contrary to Westchester's contention, the Paria court did not find that PGM was 
"merely a continuation" of Paria. And although the Paria court specifically found that the 
transaction between Paria and PGM was fraudulent and was entered into in order for 
Paria to escape liability for its debts, PGM is not bound by this finding because, as 
explained above, PGM was not a party to the Paria proceeding and PGM never had the 
opportunity to litigate this issue in court. 
12 
< 
3. Because of the circularity involved in determining the issue of 
privity when that is the procedural and substantive issue 
presented, the application of res judicata is inappropriate. 
It is clear that whether PGM is in privity with Paria and/or Stephen Zimmerman as 
their alter ego determines whether res judicata applies. It is also clear that the issue of 
privity and alter ego is the substantive issue PGM seeks to litigate. Because of the 
circularity involved in such a situation, the Eighth Circuit has held that res judicata is not 
appropriate when the procedural issue and substantive issue are the same issues of privity 
and alter ego. Crest Tankers v. National Maritime Union of America. 769 F.2d 234 (8th 
Cir. 1986). 
Westchester argues that Crest Tankers does not apply because it centered on a 
labor dispute involving large co-subsidiaries and their parent corporation; therefore, 
whether the corporations are alter egos would be much more difficult to determine. 
However, Westchester gives no reason why it would be a more difficult determination 
and offers no conclusion as to why this alleged greater degree of difficulty has any 
relevance to the present action. The alter-ego issue in this case would appear to be just as 
difficult an issue, and any relative difference in degree of difficulty is not a valid basis for 
Westchester's attempt to distinguish Crest Tankers. 
In Crest Tankers, the procedural issue of privity between two co-subsidiary 
corporations and their parent corporation was too circular to apply res judicata when the 
identity of the corporations was the substantive issue sought to be litigated. In the present 
13 
case, PGM contends that it is not in privity and is not the alter ego of Paria, a separate 
corporation. Westchester's argument is that PGM may not dispute that it is the alter ego 
of Paria and Stephen Zimmerman because PGM is the alter ego. The circularity of this 
argument makes res judicata inappropriate. The reasoning in Crest Tankers is sound and 
should be persuasive. 
Moreover, res judicata is inapplicable for an additional reason: The judgment 
entered against PGM in the Paria proceeding is void because the Paria court did not have 
jurisdiction over PGM. The doctrine of res judicata is intended to "preserve the integrity 
of judgments." Appellee's Brief, p. 13. Because there is no integrity in an invalid or void i 
judgment, res judicata is inapplicable. PGM is not taking a "second bite at the apple." 
PGM is contesting the entry of a $244,976.82 judgment entered against it when it had not 
been named, had not been served, and had not appeared with full opportunity to contest 
jurisdiction. 
i 
II. ALLOWING PGM ITS DAY IN COURT TO COLLATERALLY ATTACK 
THE DETERMINATION THAT IT IS THE ALTER EGO OF PARIA WILL 
NOT RESULT IN A NEVER-ENDING SERIES OF LAWSUITS. 
Westchester contends that PGM should be bound by the judgment entered in the < 
Paria proceeding, despite the fact that PGM was not named, was not served, and did not 
appear in the Paria proceeding, because failure to bind PGM will result in a never-ending 
series of lawsuits. 
Such argument is meritless. Further litigation may be prevented simply by issuing 
I 
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injunctions prohibiting transfers by all corporations from which Westchester seeks relief. 
This remedy is available to Westchester pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-8(c)(ii). 
Of course, such corporations must be named and served pursuant to the prescribed 
procedures in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and long-recognized due process rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment entered against PGM in the Paria proceeding, including the finding 
relating to the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act, is void and not binding upon PGM because 
PGM was not named, was not served, and did not appear in the Paria proceeding. This is 
the case despite the allegation that PGM is the alter ego of Paria and Stephen 
Zimmerman. Because the judgment entered against PGM in the Paria proceeding is void 
as to PGM, it is not res judicata to PGM. PGM respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court's dismissal of PGM's complaint and remand this case for further 
proceedings on the merits. 
Dated this _6_ day of November, 1999. 
Respectfully, submitted 
BRENT D.Y<f)U$B 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-8 
B. Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-9 
C. Tanaka v. Nagata. 868 P.2d 450 (Hawaii 1994) 
D. Murdock v.Blake. 484 P.2d 164 (Utah 1971) 
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A. Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-8 
UT ST § 25-6-8, Remedies of creditors Pagel 
Utah Code § 25-6-8 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 25. FRAUD 
CHAPTER 6. UNIFORM 
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this 
document.) 
Current through End of 1999 General Sess. 
§ 25-6-8. Remedies of creditors 
(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or 
obligation under this chapter, a creditor, subject 
to the limitations in Section 25-6-9, may obtain: 
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to 
the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's 
claim; 
(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy 
against the asset transferred or other property of 
the transferee in accordance with the procedure 
prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; 
(c) subject to applicable principles of equity 
and in accordance with applicable rules of civil 
procedure: 
(i) an injunction against further disposition by 
the debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset 
transferred or of other property; 
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of 
the asset transferred or of other property of the 
transferee; or 
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may 
require. 
(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a 
claim against the debtor, the creditor, if the 
court orders, may levy execution on the asset 
transferred or its proceeds. 
As enacted by Chapter 59, Laws of Utah 1988. 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 25. FRAUD 
CHAPTER 6. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT 
TRANSFER ACT 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
Copyright (c) West Group 1999 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
B. Utah Code Annotated § 25-6-9 
UT ST § 25-6-9, Good faith transfer Pagel 
Utah Code § 25-6-9 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 25. FRAUD 
CHAPTER 6. UNIFORM 
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 
(Information regarding effective dates, 
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in this 
document.) 
Current through End of 1999 General Sess. 
§ 25-6-9. Good faith transfer 
(1) A transfer or obligation is not voidable 
under Subsection 25-6-5 (l)(a) against a person 
who took in good faith and for a reasonably 
equivalent value or against any subsequent 
transferee or obligee. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this 
section, to the extent a transfer is voidable in an 
action by a creditor under Subsection 25-6-8 
(l)(a), the creditor may recover judgment for 
the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted 
under Subsection (3), or the amount necessary 
to satisfy the creditor's claim, whichever is less. 
The judgment may be entered against: 
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the 
person for whose benefit the transfer was made; 
or 
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a 
good faith transferee who took for value or from 
any subsequent transferee. 
(3) If the judgment under Subsection (2) is 
based upon the value of the asset transferred, the 
judgment must be for an amount equal to the 
value of the asset at the time of the transfer, 
subject to an adjustment as equities may require. 
(4) Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or 
an obligation under this chapter, a good-faith 
transferee or obligee is entitled, to the extent of 
Copyright (c) West Group 1999 
the value given the debtor for the transfer or 
obligation, to: 
(a) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in 
the asset transferred; 
(b) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or 
(c) a reduction in the amount of the liability on 
the judgment. 
(5) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 
25-6-5 (l)(b) or Section 25-6-6 if the transfer 
results from: 
(a) termination of a lease upon default by the 
debtor when the termination is pursuant to the 
lease and applicable law; or 
(b) enforcement of a security interest in 
compliance with Title 70A, Chapter 9, the 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
(6) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 
25-6-6 (2): 
(a) to the extent the insider gave new value to 
or for the benefit of the debtor after the transfer 
was made unless the new value was secured by 
a valid lien; 
*7825 (b) if made in the ordinary course of 
business or financial affairs of the debtor and 
the insider; or 
(c) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to 
rehabilitate the debtor and the transfer secured 
present value given for that purpose as well as 
an antecedent debt of the debtor. 
As enacted by Chapter 59, Laws of Utah 1988. 
WEST'S UTAH CODE 
TITLE 25. FRAUD 
CHAPTER 6. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT 
TRANSFER ACT 
claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
UT ST § 25-6-9, Good faith transfer Page 2 
Search this disc for cases citing this section. 
Copyright (c) West Group 1999 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
C. Tanaka v. Nagata. 868 P.2d 450 (Hawaii 1994) 
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[10] In the present case, the family court 
did not specify whether Husband had made a 
gift of his separate assets that were not 
credited to him, thereby giving rise to an 
appearance of a Gussin violation. However, 
as discussed above, the family court is ac-
corded broad discretion in deciding what is 
just and equitable under the circumstances. 
Judge Luke, in response to the subsequent 
motion for reconsideration, clearly articulat-
ed the reasoning underlying the exclusion of 
those particular assets in her order of distri-
bution. And because the family courts are 
not bound by any "fixed rule for determining 
the amount of property being awarded each 
spouse," the court may, subject to the param-
eters of HRS § 580-47, exercise its own in-
dependent judgment in arriving at a just and 
equitable result. Gussin, 73 Haw. at 479, 
836 P.2d at 489. Inasmuch as Judge Luke 
has not abused the broad discretion afforded 
by HRS § 580-47, we uphold her division of 
the Tougases' marital property. 
3. Deviation From Equal Division 
of Joint Btisiness 
[11] Finally, Wife argues that because 
the court determined that both she and Hus-
band contributed as equal partners to the 
formation and operation of PDI, she should 
be allotted fifty percent, and not twenty-five 
percent, of the business. 
[12] The analysis of this contention is 
very much the same as that utilized above. 
Again, the court's actions in distributing the 
estate are discretionary, based on what the 
court deems to be just and equitable under 
the circumstances. Moreover, because the 
applicable statute, HRS § 580-47, allows the 
court to consider the condition of the parties 
after the divorce, separate property holdings 
may properly factor into the court's consider-
ation. This does not mean, however, that 
Wife's partnership interests should offset 
Husband's interest in the marital estate. 
The validation of the spousal consent agree-
ment, which operates as a waiver by Hus-
band of all rights to the partnerships, conclu-
sively establishes the contrary. The court 
may, nevertheless, alter alimony, child sup-
port and, as in this case, the ultimate distri-
bution of the marital estate based on the 
respective separate conditions of the spouses. 
We therefore hold that Judge Luke's devi-
ation from the equal division of the Tougases' 
joint property is justified in light of Wife's 
significant separate property holdings. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we affirm the family court's 
division and distribution of the Tougases' 
marital property. 
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James K. TANAKA, Fusako 
Tanaka, Petitioners, 
and 
Ben T. Tanaka, Defendant, 
v. 
Russell S. NAGATA, Judge, First Circuit 
Court, State of Hawai'i, and All Lease, 
Inc., Respondent/Plaintiff. 
No. 17615. 
Supreme Court of Hawaii. 
Feb. 11, 1994. 
Property transferees petitioned for writ 
of mandamus directing the Circuit Court, 
First Circuit, Russell Nagata, J., to vacate 
and set aside order in creditor's underlying 
action against transferor debtor granting mo-
tion for execution on fraudulently transferred 
asset, on ground that transferees should have 
been named as party defendants in underly-
ing action. The Supreme Court held that: 
(1) when a creditor alleges fraudulent trans-
fer of property from a judgment debtor to a 
transferee who retains title to subject prop-
erty or who claims interest in property or its 
proceeds, transferee is necessary party to 
any action seeking to set aside transfer, and 
TANAKA v. NAGATA 
Cite as 868 P.2d 450 (Hawaii 1994) 
(2) transferees were entitled to writ of man- 7. Mandamus <§=>4(4), 53 
damus. 
Hawaii 451 
Writ granted. 
1. Mandamus <s>l 
Mandamus is extraordinary remedy that 
is not issued unless petitioner demonstrates 
clear and indisputable right to relief and lack 
of other means adequately to redress alleged 
wrong or obtain requested action. 
2. Mandamus <£=>4(1), 28 
Writs of mandamus are neither meant to 
supersede legal discretionary authority of 
lower courts nor to serve as legal remedies in 
lieu of normal appellate procedure. 
3. Mandamus <3=*4(1), 26 
Mandamus is appropriate remedy where 
petitioner has indisputable right to defend 
his or her interest in property, has not been 
named as party in proceeding in lower court, 
and has no remedy by way of appeal. 
4. Fraudulent Conveyances <£=>255(4) 
When creditor alleges fraudulent trans-
fer of property from judgment debtor to 
transferee who retains title to subject prop-
erty or who claims interest in property or its 
proceeds, transferee is necessary party to 
any action seeking to set aside transfer. 
HRS §§ 651C-4(a)(2), 651C-7. 
5. Fraudulent Conveyances <£»237(1), 
255(4) 
WTien creditor seeks to set aside debt-
or's transfer of property as fraudulent, credi-
tor's action for relief should be brought pur-
suant to Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 
and should expressly name alleged fraudu-
lent transferees as defendants. HRS 
§ 651C-1 et seq. 
6. Constitutional Law <S=>278(1.1) 
Fraudulent Conveyances @=>306 
Fundamental principles of due process 
require that transferee who claims interest in 
real property or its proceeds have full and 
feir opportunity to contest claims of fraudu-
lent transfer. HRS§§ 651C-4(a)(2), 651C-7; 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
Property transferees were entitled to 
writ of mandamus directing circuit court to 
vacate and set aside order in creditor's un-
derlying action against transferor debtor 
granting motion for execution on fraudulent-
ly transferred asset; creditor should have 
filed separate action against transferees to 
set aside alleged fraudulent transfer, and 
transferees had no alternative remedy to 
writ, as transferees had no right to appeal 
order in underlying action. HRS §§ 651C-
4(a)(2), 651C-7. 
Syllabus by the Court 
1. Mandamus is an extraordinary rem-
edy that is not issued unless the petitioner 
demonstrates a clear and indisputable right 
to relief and a lack of other means adequate-
ly to redress the alleged wrong or obtain the 
requested action. 
2. Mandamus is an appropriate remedy 
where the petitioner: (1) has an indisputable 
right to defend his or her interest in proper-
ty; (2) has not been named as a party in the 
proceeding in the lower court; and (3) has no 
remedy by way of appeal. 
3. Where a creditor alleges a fraudu-
lent transfer of property from a judgment 
debtor to a transferee who retains title to the 
subject property or who claims an interest in 
the property or its proceeds, the transferee 
is a necessary party to any action seeking to 
set aside the transfer. 
4. Fundamental principles of due pro-
cess require that a transferee who claims an 
interest in real property or its proceeds have 
a full and fair opportunity to contest claims 
of fraudulent transfer. 
George K. Noguchi, Honolulu, on the writ 
and reply, for petitioners. 
Jeffrey Daniel Lau, Keith Y. Yamada and 
Carina Y. Miyazawa, Honolulu, on the an-
swer, for respondent. 
Before MOON, C.J., and KLEIN, 
LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA and RAMIL, JJ. 
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PER CURIAM. 
In this original proceeding, the petitioners 
James K. Tanaka and Fusako Tanaka (the 
petitioners) petition this court for an extraor-
dinary writ directing the Honorable Judge 
Russell Nagata, Judge of the District Court 
of the First Circuit assigned to serve tempo-
rarily as a Judge of the Circuit Court of the 
First Circuit,1 to vacate and set aside his 
order granting a motion for execution on 
fraudulently transferred asset, entered on 
October 6,1993, in All Lease, Inc. v. Tanaka, 
Civil No. 92-2858-08 (All Lease), and any 
subsequent orders related to it. The peti-
tioners contend that they should have been 
named as party defendants in the All Lease 
action because the subject property was 
transferred to them and they have an inter-
est in the property. 
Upon review of the record before us, we 
conclude that the petitioners have an interest 
in the subject property and were indispens-
able parties in any action to set aside the 
conveyance to them. Accordingly, we grant 
the requested relief and vacate the order 
granting motion for execution on fraudulent-
ly transferred asset and any subsequent or-
ders related to it. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The petitioners are the parents of the de-
fendant Ben Tanaka (Ben). When Ben and 
his wife, Mari Tanaka (Mari), divorced in 
1991, the couple owned a condominium (the 
property). Mari conveyed her half interest 
in the property to the petitioners on April 30, 
1991. As a consequence, the petitioners 
owned a one-half interest and Ben owned a 
one-half interest in the property as tenants 
1. By order of the Chief Justice dated August 27, 
1993. See Article VI, § 2 of the Hawai'i Consti-
tution (1978). 
2. The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act is codi-
fied under Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) ch. 
651C (1985). HRS § 651C-4(a)(2) provides in 
relevant part: 
§ 651C-4 Transfers fraudulent as to present 
and future creditors, (a) A transfer made or 
obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as 
to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim 
arose before or after the transfer was made 
and the obligation was incurred, if the debtor 
made the transfer or incurred the obligation: 
in common. On July 15,1991, the petitioners 
and Ben entered into an agreement to sell 
the property to Hakim Properties, Inc. (Hak-
im Properties) for $432,000.00. Ben quit-
claimed his remaining one-half interest in the 
property to the petitioners on September 18, 
1991, purportedly to satisfy debts owed to 
the petitioners. Because Hakim Properties 
was unable to obtain financing, the contract 
for the sale of the property was amended to 
an agreement of sale, which was executed on 
October 9, 1992. According to the agree-
ment of sale, Hakim Properties agreed to 
assume three existing mortgages on the 
property for which Ben was liable and 
agreed to pay the petitioners $3,736.67 per 
month for thirty-six months, beginning on 
November 5, 1992. ' 
On August 6, 1992, All Lease, Inc. (the 
respondent) filed the All Lease complaint in 
the circuit court against Ben for default of a 
vehicle lease agreement. The complaint 
sought back payments on the lease and re-
possession of the vehicles. On February 17, 
1993, a judgment was entered against Ben in 
the amount of $67,770.00. 
On May 24, 1993, the respondent moved to 
examine the petitioners about Ben's financial 
affairs and was granted leave to question 
them regarding the transfer of the property. 
Unable to collect the judgment from Ben, the 
respondent filed a motion for execution on 
fraudulently transferred asset on September 
3, 1993. In the motion, the respondent al-
leged that the petitioners were not the actual 
owners of the property because there was no 
consideration for the transfer and the trans-
fer was made to the petitioners in contempla-
tion of avoiding Ben's debt.2 The petitioners 
(2) Without receiving a reasonably equiva-
lent value in exchange for the transfer of obli-
gation, and the debtor: 
(A) Was engaged or was about to engage in 
a business or a transaction for which the re-
maining assets of the debtor were unreason-
ably small to the business or transaction; or 
(B) Intended to incur, or believed or reason-
ably should have believed that the debtor 
would incur, debts beyond the debtor's ability 
to pay as they became due. 
HRS § 651C-7 provides in relevant part: 
Remedies of creditors, (a) In any action for 
relief against a transfer or obligation under 
this chapter, a creditor, subject to the limita-
tions provided in section 651C-8, may obtain: 
X X U »» ltJ.,1 
Cite as 868 P.2d 450 (Hawaii 1994) 
i U i ) 
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«?ere not named as parties, but the respon-
dent did serve them with notice of the hear-
se. Although Ben filed no opposition, his 
attorney appeared at the hearing on Septem-
j,er 24, 1993 to request a continuance. The 
circuit court denied the continuance and 
granted the respondent's motion. On Octo-
ber 6, 1993, the circuit court entered the 
order granting the respondent's motion for 
execution of fraudulently transferred asset 
that decreed as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AD-
JUDGED AND DECREED that Plain-
tiffs Motion for Execution on Fraudulently 
- Transferred Asset be and is hereby grant-
ed; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, AD-
JUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff 
is allowed to execute on the receivables of 
James K. Tanaka and Fusako Tanaka aris-
ing out of their Agreement of Sale to Hak-
im Properties, Inc. dated October 9, 1992 
relating to the sale of Apt. 601, Punahou 
Palms condominium and to credit any mo-
nies received thereunder to the outstand-
ing Judgment in favor of Plaintiff and 
against Defendant Ben T. Tanaka. 
The circuit court subsequently issued a gar-
nishee summons and order and directed 
Hakim Properties to hold all debts owed to 
the petitioners and to make the monthly 
payments to the respondent. Although the 
petitioners were not parties to the action, 
they nevertheless filed a motion for reconsid-
eration. The motion was denied, and the 
petitioners filed the instant petition. 
II. STANDARD FOR DISPOSITION 
[1--3] This court has consistently held 
that a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary 
(1) Avoidance of the transfer or obligation to 
the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's 
claim; 
(b) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on 
a claim against the debtor, the creditor may, if 
the court so orders, levy execution on the asset 
transferred or its proceeds. 
HRS § 651C-8 delineates the defenses, liability, 
and protection accorded to transferees. The pe-
titioners are transferees in the instant case. 
*• In Stewart Properties, the ICA suggested that a 
non-paity whose interest is affected by a trial 
court's judgment should seek intervention for the 
remedy that is usually not issued unless the 
petitioner demonstrates: (1) a clear and in-
disputable right to relief; and (2) a lack of 
other means adequately to redress the al-
leged wrong or obtain the requested action. 
Breiner v. Takao, 73 Haw. 499, 502, 835 P.2d 
637, 640 (1992) (citations omitted). Such 
writs are neither meant to supersede the 
legal discretionary authority of the lower 
courts nor to serve as legal remedies in lieu 
of normal appellate procedure. State ex rel 
Marsland v. Town, 66 Haw. 516, 668 P.2d 25 
(1983). Mandamus is an appropriate remedy 
where the petitioners, as in the instant pro-
ceeding, have an indisputable right to defend 
their interest in property, have not been 
named as parties to the lower court action, 
and have no remedy by way of appeal. See 
Stewart Properties, Inc. v. Brennan, 8 Haw. 
App. 431, 807 P.2d 606 (1991) (only parties to 
a lawsuit may appeal from any adverse judg-
ment).3 
III. DISCUSSION 
The petitioners argue that: (1) they were 
denied due process when their property was 
taken without notice and an opportunity to 
be heard; (2) the circuit court had no author-
ity to issue the disputed order because the 
petitioners were not named as parties to the 
All Lease action; and (3) there is no alterna-
tive to a writ because the petitioners were 
not parties to the proceedings below and 
have no remedy by way of appeal. The 
respondent acknowledges that the petitioners 
were not parties to the action, but contends 
that it was unnecessary to name the petition-
ers as parties because: (1) the evidence es-
tablished conclusively that the property was 
fraudulently transferred;4 and (2) any pro-
purposes of appeal and that a denial of such a 
motion to intervene would be appealable. Stew-
art Properties, 8 Haw.App. at 433 n. 1., 807 P.2d 
at 607 n. 1. (citing Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 
303, 108 S.Ct. 586, 587, 98 L.Ed.2d 629 (1988)). 
In the present case, the petitioners, who were not 
represented by counsel until after the respon-
dent's motion was granted, did not move to inter-
vene. We decline, under these circumstances, to 
require them to have intervened. 
4. Although the circuit court did not specifically 
find that the conveyance from Ben to the peti-
tioners was fraudulent, that finding is implicit in 
- — . * * , M U kJ.OXVl.CiO 
ceeds from the sale of the property belonged 
to Ben and not to the petitioners. The re-
spondent also contends that the petitioners 
have a remedy against Ben and that relief by 
way of mandamus is therefore not warranted. 
A. The Respondent Should Have Filed A 
Separate Action Against The Petitioners 
In Their Attempt To Set Aside The Al-
leged Fraudulent Transfer 
Although there is no recent Hawaii au-
thority expressly denominating the necessary 
parties to an action to set aside an alleged 
fraudulent transfer, our territorial court not-
ed that, in this jurisdiction, a transfer to 
defraud a creditor is void as to the creditor 
and the question whether the transfer was 
bona fide may be adjudicated in an action at 
law; in order to do so, however, it is clearly 
necessary to have the alleged fraudulent 
transferee before the court in order to bind 
him. Hoffschlaeger Co. v. Jones, 24 Haw. 74 
(1917) (citations omitted). Although the 
statement regarding a transferee in Hoffs-
chlaeger is dictum, it is consistent with deci-
sions from courts in other jurisdictions that 
have ruled that a grantee or transferee of 
property, who claims an interest therein, is a 
necessary and indispensable party to the res-
olution of a claim of fraudulent transfer. 
See, e.g., Simmons v. Clark Equipment Cred-
it Corp., 554 So.2d 398, 399 (Ala.1989) (grant-
ee who retained title to property was neces-
sary party to action by grantor's creditors to 
set aside conveyance as fraudulent); T W M 
Homes, Inc. v. Atherwood Realty & Invest-
ment Co., 214 Cal.App.2d 826, 847, 29 Cal. 
Rptr. 887, 899 (1963) (transferees were nec-
essary party defendants in action to set aside 
fraudulent conveyance); Guice v. Modica, 
337 So.2d 302, 303 (La.App.1976) (children to 
whom debtor made donation of property 
were indispensable parties to suit by creditor 
to nullify donation); Mihajlovski v. Elfakir, 
135 Mich.App. 528, 535, 355 N.W.2d 264, 267 
(1984) (presence of grantee who retains title 
to property was essential to permit court to 
the court's order that allowed the respondent to 
execute on the proceeds that the petitioners had 
received. 
5. Although the petitioners sold the property by 
way of agreement of sale to Hakim Properties, 
render complete relief in action to set aside 
fraudulent conveyance); Murray v. Mtirrau" 
358 So.2d 723, 725 (Miss.1978) (grantee * 
necessary party in action to set aside fraudu-* 
lent conveyance); Dempsey & Spring, P.C.fi 
Ramsay, 79 A.D.2d 1017, 1018, 435 N.Y.S.2d 
336, 337 (1981) (trial court acted improperly 
in determining that defendant's conveyance 
of property to his daughter was fraudulent 
where no notice or opportunity to appeal was 
afforded to daughter, who was present owner 
of record); Fraley Ins. Agency v. Johnston, * 
784 P.2d 430 (Okl.App.1989) (in action to set 
aside fraudulent conveyance or transfer of 
property, grantee or transferee claiming in-
terest in subject property was necessary and 
indispensable to resolution of claim); Becker 
v. Becker, 138 Vt. 372, 380, 416 A.2d 156,162 * 
(1980) (transfer of property creates interest . 
in grantee that made grantee necessary par-
ty to action for fraudulent conveyance, even 
though no fraud on grantee's part needed to 
be shown); see also Kennedy, Reception of 
the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 43 
S.C.L.Rev. 655, 673 (1992) (to avoid constitu-
tional due process objections, any transferee 
or other claimant to property transferred or 
its proceeds should be party to any creditor's 
action that would affect claimant's rights in 
property). 
[4-6] We agree with the authority cited 
above, reaffirm the dictum in Hoffschlaeger, 
and hold that where a creditor alleges a 
fraudulent transfer of property from a judg-
ment debtor to a transferee who retains title 
to the subject property or who claims an 
interest in the property or its proceeds, the 
transferee is a necessary party to any action 
seeking to set aside the transfer.5 Such an 
action for relief against a transfer alleged to 
be fraudulent should be brought pursuant to 
Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) ch. 651C 
(1985), see supra n. 2, and should expressly 
name the alleged fraudulent transferees as 
defendants. Our holding is consistent with 
established Hawai'i law regarding the nam-
ing of parties in property disputes. Cf Ros-
they remain the titleholders of the property until 
the payments under the agreement of sale are 
completed in 1995. The petitioners also have a 
claim to the monthly proceeds from the sale of 
the property. 
KO'OLAU AGR. v. COM'N ON WATER RES. MGT. Hawaii 455 
Cite as 868 P.2d 455 (Hawaii 1994) 
respondent's motion for execution on fraudu-
lently transferred asset and any subsequent 
orders related to it. 
siter v. Rossiter, 4 HawApp. 333, 337, 666 
P.2d 617, 620 (1983) (record owner of proper-
ty was necessary and indispensable party to 
action affecting her interest in property, and 
family court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate 
questions affecting title to property where 
record owner not named as party). Funda-
mental principles of due process require that 
transferees who claim an interest in real 
property or its proceeds have a full and fair 
opportunity to contest claims of fraudulent 
transfer. Because the respondent resorted 
to an improper vehicle for establishing a 
fraudulent transfer, the order granting the 
respondent's motion to execute on fraudu-
lently transferred asset must be vacated.6 
B. The Petitioners Have No Alternative 
Remedy To A Writ 
[7] Contrary to the respondent's conten-
tion, the petitioners have no alternative rem-
edy to a writ. As the circuit court ruling 
now stands, the petitioners have no right to 
appeal because they were not parties to the 
All Lease action. See Stewart Properties, 
Inc., 8 HawApp. at 433, 807 P.2d at 607 (only 
parties to a lawsuit may appeal from an 
adverse judgment). The circuit court al-
lowed the petitioners to file a motion for 
reconsideration, but this action alone did not 
make them parties to the proceedings. Fur-
thermore, it is questionable whether a non-
party could even file such a motion in a 
pending action. However, as we have noted, 
after the disputed order is vacated, the re-
spondent can file an action under HRS ch. 
651C naming the petitioners as defendants. 
It is possible that the circuit court may con-
clude that the respondent is entitled to gar-
nish the payments that Hakim Properties 
makes to the petitioners. Should it do so, 
the petitioners, as named defendants, would 
then have a remedy by way of appeal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we direct Judge 
Nagata, the administrative judge of the First 
Circuit Court, or the latter's designee, to 
vacate the October 6,1993 order granting the 
6- By issuing this opinion, this court renders no 
decision on the respondent's allegation that Ben 
transferred the subject property to the petitioners 
r w i 
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KO'OLAU AGRICULTURAL CO., LTD., 
a Hawai'i corporation, Appellant, 
v. 
COMMISSION ON WATER RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT, William W. Paty in 
his capacity as Chairperson of the Com-
mission on Water Resource Manage-
ment, John C. Lewin, M.D., Michael J. 
Chun, Ph.D., Robert S. Nakata, Richard 
H. Cox and Guy K. Fujimura, in their 
capacity as members of the Commission 
on Water Resource Management, Appel-
lees. 
No. 16473. 
Supreme Court of Hawaii. 
Feb. 25, 1994. 
Agricultural firm appealed decision of 
commission on water resource management 
to designate certain aquifer systems as 
ground water management areas. The Su-
preme Court held that notice of appeal was 
not timely filed. 
Appeal dismissed. 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<3=>723 
Waters and Water Courses <s=>100 
Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to 
hear agricultural firm's appeal of decision of 
commission on water resource management 
to designate certain aquifer systems as 
ground water management areas where no-
tice of appeal was filed more than 30 days 
to avoid payment of the respondent's judgment 
against Ben. 
D. Murdock v. Blake. 484 P.2d 164 (Utah 1971) 
These actions seem to be maintained up-
on the theory that directors are trustees 
for creditors, but generally these cases 
have some element of fraud and deceit 
involved therein. * * * 
See also cases cited in the annotation at 
SO A.L.R. .462. 
We think the trial court correctly held 
that the second amended complaint did not 
state a cause of action against the individ-
ual defendants, the judgment is affirmed 
with costs to the respondents. 
CALLISTER, C. J., and TUCKETT, 
HENRIOD and CROCKETT, JJ., concur. 
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Peter B. MURDOCK and Anthony J. But-
kovich, dba P & B Oil Company, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Richard L. BLAKE, dba Wendover Richfield ; 
and Atlantic Richfield Company, a corpo-
ration, Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 12195. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 8, 1971. 
Lessor, which had obtained quashal of 
service of summons on it in action based 
on "insufficient funds" checks given by op-
erator of leased gasoline service station 
and declaration that judgment against it 
was void moved for judgment on counter-
claim for value of property sold on execu-
tion. The Third District Court, Tooele 
County, Gordon R. Hall, J., granted motion 
and plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Callister, C. J., held that where re-
turn of officer making service upon station 
operator as agent of lessor, a foreign cor-
poration, which had qualified to do busi-
ness in Utah and had a designated process 
agent, did not indicate that service could 
not have been made upon designated proc-1H 
ess agent nor show that station operator ^M 
came within statutory class of persons au- fl 
thorized to receive service of process for 9 
lessor, default judgment against lessor was a 
void. 9 
Affirmed, except for award of attor- I I 
neys' fees. II 
1. Process <£=>4 Ji 
Service of summons in conformance Jl 
with mode prescribed by statute is jurisdic- M 
tional, for it is the service of process, not M 
actual knowledge of commencement of ac- M 
tion, which confers jurisdiction. 1 
2. Process <§=>4 3 
Proper issuance and service of sum- *j 
mons is means of invoking jurisdiction of ^ 
court and of acquiring jurisdiction over 
defendant and such cannot be supplanted 
by mere notice by letter, telephone or any 
other such means. 
3. Corporations <§=*668(4) 
Judgment <&=>I4I 
Where service was not made on for-
eign corporation's designated process agent 
as provided by law, even if corporation 
had actual knowledge of the action, court 
did not have jurisdiction over corporation 
which was entitled to have default judg-
ment entered against it vacated. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, rules 4(e) (4), 41(b). 
4. Process <£=>74, 135 
Under rule providing system of classi-
fication whereby service is to be upon one 
group primarily with right to serve others 
as secondary mode, to justify service upon 
member of inferior class, it must be shown 
that service upon member of superior 
class cannot be had and.if person served 
was member of secondary class, return 
must sufficiently show facts which warrant 
service upon him. Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, rule 4(e) (4). 
5. Judgment <§=>I7(9) 
Where return of officer making serv-
ice upon alleged agent of foreign corpora-
tion, which had qualified to do business in 
Utah and had a designated process agent, 
• P 
m 
K 
w 
:V 
m 
« 
B5£ 
§€ 
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did not indicate that service could not have 
been made upon designated process agent 
nor show that person served came within 
statutory class of persons authorized to re-
ceive service of process, default judgment 
against foreign corporation was void for 
lack of proper service, even though plain-
tiffs' counsel may have received misinfor-
mation from office of Secretary of State 
to effect that corporation was not qualified 
to do business in the state. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 4(e) (4). 
6. Judgment <§=>40l 
After judgment for plaintiff is vacat-
ed, plaintiff stands in position of trustee of 
defendant of the property obtained under 
the judgment and restitution may be 
sought in the same or an independent ac-
tion. 
7. Secured Transactions <§=>I6I 
In all security interests, debtor's inter-
est in collateral remains subject to claims 
of creditors who take appropriate action. 
U.C.A.1953, 70A-1-101 et seq., 70A-9-311, 
70A-9-503; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
8(d). 
8. Secured Transactions <§=*I38, 168 
Security agreement creates in favor of 
secured party a lien entitled to priority 
over rights of unsecured creditors, but col-
lateral may still be sold by execution credi-
tor subject to interest of the secured party. 
U.C.A.1953, 70A-1-101 et seq., 70A-9-311, 
70A-9-503; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
8(d). 
9. Secured Transactions <§=>228 
Most important remedy available to se-
cured party is right to take possession of 
collateral following a debtor's default. U. 
CA.1953, 70A-1-101 et seq., 70A-9-311, 
70A-9-503; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
8(d). 
JO. Secured Transactions C=>222, 237 
After default, debtor has lost his right 
of possession in property subject to securi-
ty interest and retains only contingent 
nght in the surplus, if any, after sale. U. 
CA.1953, 70A-1-101 et seq., 70A-9-311, 
v. BLAKE Utah 165 
P.2d 164 
70A-9-503; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
8(d). 
11. Secured Transactions <&=>228 
On default, secured party is entitled to 
possession as against a subsequent levying 
creditor, for levy cannot void secured par-
ty's right to repossession. U.C.A.1953, 
70A-1-101 et seq., 70A-9-311, 70A-9-503; 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 8(d). 
12. Pleading C=>I82 
Allegations in counterclaim not re-
sponded to are deemed admitted. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, rule, 8(d). 
13. Secured Transactions OI70 , 228 
Where, at time suppliers of gasoline 
service station obtained default judgment 
against operator of station on basis of op-
erator's giving supplier's checks returned 
marked "insufficient funds", operator had 
been in default to lessor oil company which 
had security interest in tools, equipment, 
inventory and proceeds therefrom, oil com-
pany was entitled to possession of collater-
al and to recover from suppliers its value 
at time of sheriff's sale rather than pro-
ceeds of the sale. U.C.A. 1953, 70A-9-306, 
70A-9-503. 
14. Secured Transactions <§=>I7I 
One who has possession or immediate 
right to possession, such as chattel mortga-
gee or conditional seller after default, may 
maintain action for conversion against one 
who has exercised unauthorized acts of do-
minion over property. 
15. Trover and Conversion <§=>46 
Ordinarily, where there has been a 
conversion, and property is not returned, 
measure of damages is value of property at 
time of the conversion. 
Parker M. Nielson, LaMar Duncan, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
Allen H. Tibbals, of Boyden, Tibbals & 
Staten, Salt Lake City, for defendants and 
respondents. 
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CALLISTER, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiffs commenced the initial phase of 
this case in March of 1969, when they filed 
an action against Richard Blake and At-
lantic Richfield Company, alleging that 
Blake was the agent and operator of a 
service station in Wendover, Utah, which 
was owned and leased By Atlantic. Plain-
tiffs then alleged that on three separate oc-
casions, Blake, in the course of his employ-
ment, purchased merchandise for which he 
gave checks to plaintiffs, which were re-
turned to plaintiffs and marked "Insuffi-
cient Funds." Plaintiffs prayed for judg-
ment against the defendants for $2,551.98 
in their first cause of action, and for $2,-
652.89 in the second and third causes of 
action. 
Service of summons was made upon 
Blake by serving him personally, and serv-
ice upon Atlantic was made by delivering 
the summons and complaint to "Richard L. 
Blake, agent." On April 28, 1969, plain-
tiffs had a default judgment entered 
against both defendants. Plaintiffs subse-
quently brought a supplemental proceeding 
against Blake, and in May 1969, they en-
tered into a stipulation with Blake which 
provided a schedule of payments. Evident-
ly, Blake did not make the payments, and, 
thereafter, plaintiffs caused an undated ex-
ecution to be issued on the judgment. A 
sheriffs sale upon the personal property 
located in the service station was set for 
the 24th of September, 1969. Atlantic 
learned of this proposed sale and through 
its credit manager notified plaintiffs' attor-
ney that Atlantic claimed a security inter-
est in the property. Included with the let-
ter were copies of all the documents which 
indicated that Atlantic had a perfected se-
curity interest in all the tools and service 
station equipment and inventory, and pro-
ceeds therefrom. The security agreement 
had been executed November 14, 1968, to 
secure payment of a promissory note exe-
cuted by Blake on September 16, 1968, for 
the sum of $8,781.19. A financing state-
ment was filed in accordance with the Uni-
form Commercial Code in the office of the 
Secretary of State. Plaintiffs' attorney 
was admonished that legal action would be 
taken if the seizure and sale of the assets 
of the service station were consummated. 
Nevertheless, the sale was held, at which 
time three parties paid cash in the sum of 
$1,290.03; and plaintiff, Butkovich, pur-
chased the remainder for $1,531.60, which 
was applied against the judgment. 
Subsequently, Atlantic filed a motion to 
vacate the judgment and to quash the serv-
ice of summons. Atlantic alleged that 
service of summons upon it, a foreign cor-
poration, had not been in accordance with 
Rule 4(e), U.R.C.P. Atlantic pleaded that 
it was a Pennsylvania corporation, qualified 
to do business in Utah, and that at all 
times pertinent to this action it had on file 
with the Secretary of State a designated 
resident agent qualified to receive service 
of process, namely, the C. T. Corporation 
System at 175 South Main Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. The pleading stated that 
no process at any time was served upon 
this designated agent. Atlantic concluded 
that the service was defective and no juris-
diction was acquired; and, therefore, the 
judgment should be set aside and the par-
ties restored to their prior status. Plain-
tiffs' response thereto asserted that Atlan-
tic was aware of the action, and that plain-
tiffs' counsel had inquired at the office of 
the Secretary of State and been informed 
that Atlantic was not qualified to do busi-
ness in the state of Utah, and, therefore, at 
the time of service of process, Blake was 
the only agent having control of the assets 
of the corporation within the state. 
A hearing was held, and the trial court 
entered an order quashing the service of 
summons on the ground Blake was not an 
agent of Atlantic within the meaning of 
Rule 4(e) (4), U.R.C.P.; and therefore, 
service upon him was insufficient to bring 
Atlantic within the jurisdiction of the 
court. The judgment against Atlantic was 
declared void and vacated. 
Thereafter, defendant Atlantic filed a 
motion for restitution, wherein Atlantic al-
leged that its property, having a market 
MURDOCK 
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value of $4,942.88, was sold at the sheriff's 
sale. Accompanying the motion was an af-
fidavit of Atlantic's regional credit mana-
ger, itemizing the property and its value. 
Plaintiffs have never controverted this af-
fidavit. Subsequently, plaintiffs properly 
served Atlantic and then responded to the 
motion for restitution by claiming that the 
issues raised in the complaint would deter-
mine the true ownership of the property 
claimed by Atlantic. The trial court en-
tered an order requiring plaintiffs to pay 
into court the sum of $4,942.88, the value 
of the property sold, to be held by the 
clerk, subject to the order of the court as 
to the ultimate disposition thereof, based 
upon a determination of the right thereto 
as between plaintiffs and Atlantic. De-
fendant Atlantic filed an answer, counter-
claim, and a cross-claim against Blake. 
Plaintiffs filed a reply to the counterclaim, 
and an appeal to this court, which was dis-
missed as premature; the case was re-
manded to the trial court. 
Plaintiffs took no further action to com-
ply with the order of the court; so Atlan-
tic filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 
41(b), U.R.C.P., and for judgment on its 
counterclaim for the value of the property 
sold on execution under the void judgment. 
The trial court granted judgment in ac-
cordance with the motion; plaintiffs ap-
peal therefrom. 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court 
erred in vacating the default judgment en-
tered against defendant Atlantic, because 
Atlantic had actual knowledge of the ac-
tion. Plaintiffs argue that although serv-
ice was not made on Atlantic's designated 
process agent, as provided by law, Atlantic 
was aware of the impending sheriff's sale 
and contacted plaintiffs' attorney prior to 
the date upon which it was held. 
Atlantic urges that strict compliance 
with Rule 4(e) (4), U.R.C.P., is necessary 
*° acquire jurisdiction over the corporation 
'• Sternbeck v. Buck, 148 Cal.App.2d 829, 
307 P.2d 970, 972 (1957) ; Tropic Build-
ers, Ltd. v. Naval Ammunition Depot, 
48 Haw. 306, 402 P.2d 440, 448 (1965). 
v. BLAKE Utah 167 
P.2d l&i 
and that service upon Blake was not in 
conformity therewith, and was, therefore, 
insufficient; the trial court properly 
quashed the service of summons and de-
clared the judgment against Atlantic void. 
[1-3] Service of summons in conform-
ance with the mode prescribed by statute is 
deemed jurisdictional, for it is service of 
process, not actual knowledge of the com-
mencement of the action, which confers ju-
risdiction. Otherwise, a defendant could 
never object to the sufficiency of service 
of process, since he must have knowledge 
of the suit to make such objection.1 The 
proper issuance and service of summons is 
the means of invoking the jurisdiction of 
the court and of acquiring jurisdiction 
over the defendant; these cannot be sup-
planted by mere notice by letter, telephone 
or any other such means.2 
Plaintiffs further assert that service 
upon Blake wras sufficient under Rule 4(e) 
(4), U.R.C.P., to acquire jurisdiction over 
Atlantic because Blake was an agent who 
had the management and control over 
property to which Atlantic claims a right 
of possession. 
Rule 4(e), U.R.C.P., provides: 
Personal service within the state shall 
be as follows: 
(4) Upon any corporation, not herein 
otherwise provided for, * * * by de-
livering a copy thereof to an officer, a 
managing or general agent, or to any 
other agent authorized by appointment 
or by law to receive service of process 
and, if the agent is one authorized by 
statute to receive service and the statute 
so requires, by also mailing a copy to the 
defendant. If no such officer or agent 
can be found in the county in which the 
action is brought, then upon any such of-
ficer or agent, or any clerk, cashier, 
managing agent, chief clerk, or other 
2. Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp. v. 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 409, 410, 402 
P.2d 703 (1965). 
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agent having the management, direction 
or control of any property of such cor-
poration, partnership or other unincorpo-
rated association within the state. If no 
such officer or agent can be found in 
the state, and the defendant has, or ad-
vertises or holds itself out as having, an 
officer or place of business in this state, 
or does business in this state, then upon 
the person doing such business or in 
charge of such office or place of busi-
ness. 
The evidence established that Atlantic 
had been qualified to do business in the 
state of Utah, that it was in good standing, 
and that it had a designated process agent. 
[4] Rule 4(e) (4), U.R.C.P., provides a 
system of classification whereby service is 
to be upon one group primarily with a 
right to serve others as a secondary mode. 
In order to justify service upon a member 
of an inferior class under Rule 4(e) (4), 
U.R.C.P., it must be shown that service 
upon a member of the superior classes can-
not be had. If the person served was a 
member of the secondary class, the return 
must sufficiently show the facts which 
warrant service on him.3 
[5] In the instant action, Atlantic's des-
ignated agent, C. T. Corporation, was a 
member of the primary class, and Blake, 
even under plaintiffs' theory, was a mem-
ber of an inferior class. Furthermore, the 
return of the officer making the service 
neither indicated that service could not be 
made upon some member in the superior 
class, nor did it show by proper description 
that the person served came within an in-
ferior class. The affidavit of plaintiffs' 
counsel during the proceeding to quash the 
service does not cure the defect; the fact 
that counsel may have received misinfor-
mation from the office of the Secretary of 
State does not dispense with compliance 
3. Reader v. District Court, 98 Utah 1, 94 
P.2d 858 (1939) ; Boston Acme Mines 
Development Co. v. Clawson, 66 Utah 
103, 123, 124, 127, 240 P. 165 (1925) ; 
Gibbons & Reed Co. v. Standard Accident 
Insurance Co., 191 F.Supp. 174, 176 
(USDCDUtah, 1960). 
with Rule 4(e) (4), U.R.C.P., which is for-
mulated in mandatory terms. The judg-
ment against Atlantic was void for lack of 
proper service. 
Plaintiffs further contend that the trial 
court improperly granted an order for res-
titution, and, furthermore, plaintiffs should 
be compelled to restore only $2,821.63, the 
sum for which the property was sold at the 
sheriffs sale. Plaintiffs also challenge the 
court's award of attorneys' fees. 
[6] In Levy v. Drew,4 the court held 
that where a judgment has been vacated by 
a trial court, the defendant is entitled to 
restitution of all things taken from him un-
der the judgment. After the judgment is 
vacated, the plaintiff stands in the position 
of a trustee of defendant of the property 
obtained under the judgment. Restitution 
may be sought in the same or an independ-
ent action.5 
Atlantic was a secured party and Blake 
was a debtor under a security agreement, 
and the issues of the instant action must be 
determined in accordance with the Com-
mercial Code, Title 70A, U.C.A.1953, as 
amended 1965. 
70A-9-311, U.C.A.1953, as amended 
1965, provides: 
The debtor's rights in collateral may 
be voluntarily or involuntarily trans-
ferred (by way of sale, creation of a se-
curity interest, attachment, levy, garnish-
ment or other judicial process) notwith-
standing a provision in the security 
agreement prohibiting any transfer or 
making the transfer constitute a default. 
[7,8] The official comments to the 
code indicate that the purpose of Section 
9-311 is to provide without equivocation 
that in all security interests the debtor's in-
terest in the collateral remains subject to 
claims of creditors who take appropriate 
4. 4 Cal.2d 456, 50 P.2d 435, 101 A.L.R. 
1144 (1935). 
5. Also see Todaro v. Gardner, 3 Utah 2d 
404, 409, 285 P.2d 839 (1955); 46 Am. 
Jur.2d, Judgments, § 7S8, p. 949. 
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action.6 The security agreement creates in 
favor of the secured party a lien on the 
chattels involved which is entitled to prior-
ity over the rights of unsecured creditors, 
but it does not exempt the collateral from 
forced judicial sale. The collateral may 
still be sold by an execution creditor sub-
ject to the interest of the secured party.7 
Section 70A-9-311 must be construed in 
light of Section 70A-9-503,8 which pro-
vides : 
Unless otherwise agreed a secured 
party has on default the right to take 
possession of the collateral. In taking 
possession a secured party may proceed 
without judicial process if this can be 
done without breach of the peace or may 
proceed by action * * *. 
[9-11] The most important remedy 
available to a secured party is the right to 
take possession of the collateral following 
a debtor's default.9 After default the debt-
or has lost his right of possession and sale 
and retains only a contingent right in the 
surplus, if any, after sale. On default, a 
secured party is entitled to possession as 
against a subsequent levying creditor, for a 
levy cannot void the secured party's right 
to repossession.10 
[12] In the instant action, Atlantic al-
leged in its pleadings that the debtor, 
Blake, had been in default in payment of 
his promissory note; that no payment of 
any kind had been made on the obligation 
since April of 1969, and that by reason of 
Ws default, Atlantic was entitled to posses-
sion of the collateral described in the se-
v. BLAKE Utah 169 
P.2d 164 
curity agreement. These allegations were 
incorporated in Atlantic's counterclaim 
against plaintiffs, and, since plaintiffs did 
not respond thereto, they are deemed ad-
mitted under Rule 8(d), U.R.C.P. 
[13] Since Blake was in default at the 
time plaintiffs received the default judg-
ment, Atlantic was entitled to possession of 
the collateral at that time, both by virtue 
of the express provisions of the security 
agreement and by 70A-9-503. In other 
words, the right to possession and sale of 
the collateral passed from the debtor, 
Blake, to the secured party, Atlantic, at the 
time of default, and these are the rights to 
which Atlantic was entitled to be restored. 
[14] One who has possession or an im-
mediate right to possession, such as a chat-
tel mortgagee or conditional seller after 
default, may maintain an action for con-
version against one who has exercised un-
authorized acts of dominion,over the prop-
erty of another in exclusion or denial of 
his rights or inconsistent therewith.11 The 
Restatement of the Law, Restitution, § 128, 
p. 156, provides: 
A person who has tortiously obtained, 
retained, used, or disposed of the chattels 
of another, is under a duty of restitution 
to the other.12 
[15] Ordinarily, where there has been 
a conversion, and the property is not re-
turned, the measure of damages is the val-
ue of the property at the time of the 
conversion.13 The affidavit, submitted by 
Atlantic as to the value of the property at 
the time of the sheriff's sale has not been 
First National Bank of Glendale v. Sher-
iff of Milwaukee County, 34 Wis.2d 535, 
149 N.W.2d 548 (1967). 
I 
' tf*- <-> 
Altec Lansing v. Friedman Sound, Inc., 
. (Fla.App.l967) 204 So.2d 740. 
*• Harrison Music Co. v. Drake, 43 Pa. 
Dist. & Co.2d 637 (1967). 
*• Karp Bros., Inc. v. West Ward Savings 
« Loan Assn. of Shamokin, Penn., (Penn. 
Sup.Ct.1970) 271 A.2d 493. 
l t t V P l a t t e Valley Bank of North Bend v-
Kracl, 185 Neb. 168, 174 N.W.2d 724 
(1970) ; William Iselin & Co. v. Burgess 
«84 P.2d—HV2 
& Leigh, Ltd., 52 Misc.2d 821, 276 N.Y.S. 
2d 659 (1967). 
11. First National Bank of Bay Shore v. 
Stamper, 93 N.J.Super. 150, 225 A.2d 
162 (1966). 
12. Also see § 131, Illustration 3, p. 544. 
13. Whittler v. Sharp, 43 Utah 419, 426, 
135 P. 112 (1913) ; Clarke Floor Ma-
chine Div. of Studebaker Corp. v. Gordon 
(Maryland 1970), 7 U.C.C.Reptr.Serv. 
363; Doenges-Glass, Inc. v. General Mo-
tors Acceptance Corp., (Colo.1970) 472 
P.2d 761. 
controverted by plaintiffs; so Atlantic is en-
titled to that amount rather than the pro-
ceeds of the sale as urged by plaintiffs.14 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed, except for the award of attorneys' 
fees, which was predicated on a provision 
in the security agreement to which plain-
tiffs were not parties. Costs are awarded 
to defendant, Atlantic Richfield Company. 
TUCKETT, HENRIOD, ELLETT, and 
CROCKETT, JJ., concur. 
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JOHN DEERE COMPANY OF MOLINE, 
a corporation, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Harold BEHLING and Jean Behling, co-
partners, etc., Defendants and 
Appellants. 
No. 12205. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 19, 1971. 
Plaintiff brought suit to recover as as-
signee of note and security agreement by 
which defendants had purchased farm ma-
chinery from assignor. The 7th District 
Court, Emery County, Henry Ruggeri, J., 
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff, and 
defendants appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Crockett, J., held that evidence that there 
was no claim in writing that some of pur-
chased farm equipment had failed to work 
until 23 months after transaction, a few 
days before first major installment pay-
ment was due, supported finding that as-
signee of note and security agreement was 
holder in due course and entitled to re-
cover against defendants. 
Affirmed except as to award of attor-
ney's fees. 
14. It should be emphasized that Atlantic 
was entitled to possession based on 
Blake's default; if Blake had not been 
1. Bills and Notes <§=**97(l), 525 £ 
Where execution of note and security 
agreement by which defendants had pur-
chased farm machinery and assignment of 
them to plaintiff was admitted, it was pri-
ma facie established that plaintiff was 
holder in due course and entitled to re-
cover and defendants had burden of prov-
ing that plaintiff was not holder in due 
course and other affirmative defenses. U. 
C.A.1953, 70A-3-307. 
2. Sales @=>288(l) 
Absent persuasive reason for avoiding 
waiver of defense clause, warnings in doc-
uments by which defendants had purchased 
farm machinery that defendants agreed 
that defenses or breaches of warranty 
could not be asserted against third persons 
would be given effect. U.C.A.19S3, 70 A-
9-206. 
3. Bills and Notes <®=>525 
Evidence that there was no claim in 
writing that some of purchased farm 
equipment had failed to work until 23 
months after transaction, a few days be-
fore first major installment payment was 
due, supported finding that assignee of 
note and security agreement was holder in 
due course and entitled to recover against 
defendants. U.C.A.1953, 70A-3-307. 
4. Secured Transactions €=226 
In suit to recover as assignee of note 
and security agreement, where there was 
no evidence in record upon which to base 
award of attorney's fees, plaintiff was not 
entitled to such award. 
Stanley V. Litizzette, Helper, E. J. 
Skeen, R. C. Skeen, of Skeen & Skeen, 
Salt Lake City, for defendants and appel-
lants. 
S. J. Sweetring, Price, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
in default, Atlantic would merely be 
entitled to assert its priority and right 
to the proceeds. § 70A-9-306. 
